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TWO PATHS IN SEARCH OF (THE) MEANING (OF THINGS)
by Klaus Krippendorff
Introduction
In this paper I intend to examine several espistemological difficulties one quite
naturally encounters within traditional semiotics , especially when trying to apply it to
design (industrial design and product semantics 1 in particular)
Whenever a discipline encounters intellectual challenges that it cannot respond

t。

in terms 01 its own standard practices , it can either exorcise them and withdraw into a
smaller domain 01 increasingly relined but narrow applications , or it can expand its
conceptual horizon and embrace these challenges with the prospect 01 thereby loosing
its own identity. I preler the latter. My plan therelore is to remove those assumptions
that lead to untenable semiotic practices , practices that prevent semiotics Irom
participating in solving contemporary social problems , and develop lrom what remains
an alternative approach to the study 01 meaning in the broadest sense , an approach that
can more readily cope with certain intellectual challenges emerging Irom a variety 01
scholarly and practical endeavors
Seeking to understand meaning generally and the meaning 01 designed objects
particularly , we are invariaþly lead to a point at which we have to make a critical choice
between two alternative paths 01 understanding (things). The well-trodden path is called
。 bjectivism.

I will call the other constructivism. Without denying that there are various
2 , just as there also are many
shades 01 objectivism and various shades 01 constructivism"'

variations in approaches to semiotics , 1 do believe the two paths are epistemologically
incommensurable3 and lead to significantly different social practices.
Roughly , Q미g다파띨m entails a commitment to the beliel in a reality that possesses
observer- or culture-independent structures , objects , codes and laws waiting to be
discovered , enciphered and described. For objectivists , humans are plagued by
observational biases , inadequacies , illusions and metaphysical beliefs that scientific
observers seek to overcome in order to obtain increasingly accurate accounts of the one
universe that exists outside 01 them. Objective knowledge is representative 01 what
exists and the criterion for accepting a proposition as (empirically) valid is truth by
correspondence. 4
I am suggesting that the mainstream 01 semiotic scholarship is deeply rooted in
the kind of objectivism just described. This already is evident in its foundational concep t:
the

2

stands for , or an artilact and what it 잉<presses. Not only is the essential connection
between the two domains presumed discoverable , identifiable , describable and , hence ,
residing outside the observing semiotician , the product 01 scientific practice , here
semiotic theory , is conceived descriptive 01 an objective reality as well. 1suspect this
commitment to objectivism runs so deep that many semiotically informed readers of this
paper may not lind anything objectionable in this view. Taking language to refer t。
something that exists independently of it seems so obviously true. Oddly , it is the
practice of designing meaningful objects that might constitute a sufficiently strong
challenge of mainstream semiotics' receiv.ed ontology.
Constructivism , the way 1see it , takes reality as residing neither somewhere
outside or independent of its human observer , of which objectivists are unshakably
convinced , nor inside an imagining human mind , as solipsists hold true , but as arising
within the circular process 01 perception and action or of conceiving and making things ,
in other words , in practice or in social practice when other humans are as well involved
Consider walking on a beach. We feel the sand between our toes and several
inches beneath our feet and soon come to know properties we could not see before we
stepped on (or into) it: the softness , the warmth , the sound it makes walking. What
objectivists must describe as a reflection from the yellow spectrum of the sunlight
becomes for the constructivist meaningful and alive thought individual and multisensory
participation. If we cut us once on a piece 01 glass buried beneath the sand ’s surface ,
we are inclined to see glass everywhere and walk accordingly. Understanding has
nothing to do with the physics of sensation. It penetrates the visual surfaces 01
something deep into its interior. It creates a reality on which we act , a reality that
becomes manifest in practice.
Consider the notion of a gift. We give all kinds of things all the time , whether as

01 the role we are assuming , in exchange for money or in the expectation of a future
benefi t. However , what constitutes a gift is carefully negotiated between givers ,
pa야

recipients and third parties or judges not to be confused with a bribe , an insult , a burden ,
an obligation or aid

。이 ectivists

will have a hard time to find the references for what

appears to be a meaningful gift. Constructivists would consider the noti
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artilacts by others , but they do behave according to their own understanding 01 their
own experiences , whether this concerns the highly personal construction 01 sand on the
beach or the social construction 01 a gift. Taking "under-standing" Iiterally suggests that
it stands beneath or grounds reality in the social practice 01 people Iiving together.
Social practice simply becomes an unlolding 01 the constructions in the understanding 01
participating individuals. Understanding is lar lrom static. We might approach a new
product with curiosity but always handle it as a variation lrom what we already know and
what we want it to be.
Radical constructivists moreover apply the propositions they make about others
to themselves and consequently see their very own probing into meaning as a social
practice arising in their own understanding critically involving the construction 01 similarly
capable others
Leaving this introduction behind , I will now explore the two alternatives. Let me
lirst proceed along the well known road 01 mainstream and , as 1ciaim , objectivst
semiotics until some 01 its entailments come in sight and then retract to proceed on the
path less travelled , sketching the conceptual milestones I see there in passing. Figure 1
serves as a map 01 this efforl.
Figure 1
The Usual Road of Mainstream Semiotics' Objectivism
Based on the lamous semiotic triangle whose corners are occupied by signvehicle , designatum and interpretant , by utterance , meaning and concept or by related
tri-partitions lavoured by individual semioticians , Morris ’ division 01 the semioticians ’
labor into syntax , semantics and pragmatics (Morris , 1938) is widely accepted as evident
in encyclopedias and dictionaries (e.g. Sebeok , 1986). Let me state their delinitions lor
the sake 01 laying the ground:

*

Syntax is the study 01 the relations between sign-vehicles (to which some
physical existence is ascribed) ,

*

S을띠 anti드9. is the study 01 the relations between sign-vehicles and their designata ,
particularly the objects which they may or do denote , their relerents , and

*

E떡딩믹a낀딩흐 is the study 01 the relations between signs and their users and includes
in its- domain all the psychological , biological , and sociological phenomena that
occur in the functioning 01 signs

Although these delinitions appear obvious and innocent , 1am suggesting that
they exemplify a vocabulary that drives semioticians , possibly quite unknowingly , along
the objectivist road. Notice in these delinitions (1) that they presume an embedded
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hierarchy whose base rests upon the materiality of sign-vehicles that become signs by
virtue of their non-physical , grammatical , semantic and pragmatic ways of functioning;
(2) that the various relations being studied here , whether these are based on
resemblances , naturallaws , or conventions , are presumed to actually exist independent
of describing them , descriptions being viewed as representative or a reflection of the
relations as observed , and (3) that the semioticians offering descriptive accounts of their
。 bservations

in these three areas of inquiry , their own discourse , their intellectual

concerns and historical or cultural backgrounds , nowhere enters the semiotic project.
Li ke gods , semioticians keep themselves outside their object of interes t. This indeed is a

textbook example of objectivism at work.
Allow me to reframe the three areas of semiotic studies to make the nature of the
implied objectivism more transparen t. Evidently:

*

Svntax is the description of aJealitv in which humans do not exist or are not

없l깅염없댐2짧￡gi짧앓*gR짧암짧폐SS짧협gg짧염않짧F;t:g쁨없뿐1$sis
。 r purpose' may be. Geometry , grammar , composition rules and mathematics are
typicallanguages for syntactical descriptions of sign-vehicl겉 s ， but none provide in
them a place for their human creators , users or observers 니

*

S흐띠쁘따윈등 the descriotion of a realitv in which all human l' (with~~ a ~ommunity)
a띨쁘흐효a띠sl. and can therefore be ignored. This is already manifest in accepting
claims of the rather common form "something 띠응an흐 。 r refers to something other
than itself" or "something i흐 a symbol or a substitute for something else ," either of
which may be said to be part of an sl.씩학띠g code. Notwithstanding the

acknowledgement that some of the semantic relations or codes are established by
con이lention; legislated by authority or , in the case of symptoms , as having to be
discovered in nature anâ learnedto be acted upon , describing them without
references to human cognition presupposes that semantic relations or codes exist
independent of their creators and users and outside of whoever accounts for them
Thisobjectification divorces meanings from the very "somebody" that Charles S.
Pierce , in his definition of sign , made responsible for something to be meaningfu l.
Except for confining semantic descriptions to a speech community or culture ,
humans turn out to be irrelevant in such objecti씨 st accounts of meaning. Finally:

*

Praamatics is the descriotion of how humans resoond to a realitv that is the
same for evervon sl. (,:,ithin a c~m.m~nit~). St~dy.inq "~he ~~es ~f si (il ~s" pesu es
kn。wing the SIgns whose use is belng lnvestigated- lnquirk1g int。 ”the interpretat1on
of a texP' presu-mes the existence of a text that is knowable and independent of its
interpretation. By packing into pragmatics all the biological , psychological ,
sociological and political aspects of signs presumes a non-biological , nonpsychorogical , non-sociological and non-political realm of e)(istence in which signs ,
their syntax and semantics reside una什ected by their use 。이 ectivist pragmatics
(which almost is a contradiction in terms) here admits individual variation , whether
due to biases , incompetencies , misunderstandings or interests , but always in
response to or in the'use of a common reality , a universe of shared signs, symbols
。 r meanings that are the same for everybodý. --how else could one establish
biases ,

n:
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One may not like this characterization 01 semiotics , but 1suggest it lairly
accurately describes mainstream semiotics ’ epistemological assumptions as manilest in
its vocabulary and linguistic practices. Let me elaborate on live entailments 01 objectivist
semiotics , its intellectual imperialism , its predisposition lor standardization , it dualism , its
paradoxes and inconsistencies , and its lack 01 sell-relerence. An example might
illustrate where this road takes us.
Its Intellectual Imperialism. In a recent and unlortunately rather naive article in
Eα띠，

Uri Friedlander (1989) , a designer by trade and probably quite unaware 01 the

epistemology he was tampering with , tried to drag product semantics along the very
。 bjectivist

road it had deviated Irom by accounting lor the meaning 01 artilacts without

any concern lor either individual cognition or the social practices 01 users or designers.
To support his contention , that product semantics was already known during the stone
age , he presented several images 01 artilacts. Two examples are reproduced in Figure 2
respectively captioned "bronze handle" 01 a door with the comment "the lion as symbol

01 protection. Roman 100-300 AD" and "cosmetic spoon. The lion and the eagle as
guardian angel 01 beauty ... Egypt 1250BC."
Figure 2
Notwithstanding his rather careless conlusion 01 ages , one is compelled to ask:
How does Friedlander know what these artilacts meant? How can he possibly speak lor
what people had in mind thousands 01 years ago? Does he have any evidence about
how the artilact now called "cosmetic spoon" was perceived , talked about and used by
ancient Egyptians? Were there guardian angels? Was the owner 01 the house with such
a bronze handle really so insecure that he or she needed the image 01 a lion lor
protection? And did it work?
Let me propose that any assertion 01 what something means speaks loremost lor
the speaker , here a 1989 Friedlander. A statement 01 what something means to
someone else is far more difficult to substantiate. 1I we happen to lind something
interesting and meaninglul to warrant joint attention or il we see it as a sign 01 something
else , then this takes place in our own contemporary culture , in our own living language
and in the presence 01 our own cognition. Our own and always contemporary
perception provides us with no indication 01 how the ancient maker or users 01 an artilact
saw what we see or was conscious 01 what we now t

6

paintings 01 Lascaux , lor a stone age example , had any notions resembling ours , least 01
all of product semantics. The claim that one ’ s own perceptions equal those of everyone
else , past and future , here and everywhere is an ethnocentrism , or betler still , an
intellectual imperialism we ought not to tolerate in our midst and certainly not clothe in
scientific terms.
I am suggesting that the intellectual imperialism in the above is the consequence
of a vocabulary that drives mainstream semioticians to confuse their discourse and their
way of seeing with the objectivity of the things seen or talked about and constructs a
single , objective and coherent universe in which humans either play no role (in the case
。f

syntax) or are so alike (in the case of objectivist semantics) that their nature does not

matter. The imperialists’ language here becomes privileged , universal and transparen t.
This imperialism does not 싸 11 people or capture territory (although such could become its
consequence). Minimally , it is an act of disrespect for the cognitive autonomy of other
individuals , their ability to make their own sense of their own world and maximally , it is an
act 01 oppressing the views of other cultures , ethnic minorities and the less privileged ,
ruling their identity out of existence to the benefit of the semioticians ’ 。wn position of
authority
Since there is no easy test for the sharing of perceptions among contemporaries
and much less across cultures and ages , an objectivist discourse on meaning that
generates assertions like "the lion is a symbol of protection" (without qualifying for whom ,
when and in what circumstances) , implying that everyone must be able to see what
。 bviously
。f

s。

and objectively "exists ," claims unquestionable hegemony over the discourses

others. The publication of Friedlander’ s therewith expressed views implicitly supports

the imperialist claims of mainstream semiotics. Even modern market researchers would
discredit themselves by not qualifying accounts of the meanings of products.
Its Predisposition for Standardization. If 1were to see a door with a ring held
in place by what resembles to me a lion ’ s teeth , I could invent numerous equally
plausible explanations ranging from the reputed strength of a lion ’ s teeth (the conviction
"a lion will not surrender his prey" maybe an analogue to "the ring can ’ t be pulled out") to
that it might be the original home 01 a traveller , hunter or

li。
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readers from recognizing cultural diversity.
The semiotic view of communication as exchanging signs chosen from a common
repertoire

α

as using a common code for translating sign-vehicles into their

corresponding designata (or representations thereof) elevates the objectivists ’
disrespect for cultural diversity and individual autonomy to a theoretically motivated
social norm. In this view, only the sharing of meanings , only the invariability of encoding
and decoding processes , only the sameness of the senders' and receivers' processing
equipment makes communication and by implication society possible. Accordingly , if
the image of a lion would not mean the same for everyone it could not induce the fear
necessary to deter thieves or offer protection against disasters , just as a message that
does not point everyone to the same referent could not have generalizable effects. In
this objectivist view , the standardization of signs , their meanings and their use , is a
prerequisite of understanding , communication and social orderliness.
It is therefore not surprising that Friedlander is driven to the very same
conclusion , calling for the search and use by designers of "culture-independent
symbols ," implying that they could exist everywhere and for everyone alike. In the same
vein , the writer of the call for papers for the design section of this congress laments the
lack of uniformity in human-product relationships and warns against a new "Babylonian
confusion" in the design of computer interfaces , especially in the icons used for
manipulating computer screens. Undoubtedly , there occasionally are good reasons for
inventing and institutionally enforcing standardized symbol systems , for example , public
traffic signs , whose ability to coordinate human behavior benefits all participants. But
such examples are few
In design , standardization has always supported mass production for mass
consumers and enabled mass contro l. In contrast , whether this is due to an increasing
material abundance , to the availability of new technologies , to widespread
democratization of culture or to post-modern attitudes , standardization for the sake of
theory is increasingly seen as oppressive. For example , personal computers were
developed with the explicit intent to counter what was then perceived as a tendency
towards centralization of intelligence. This new technology was envisioned as cheap
and henc
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the process. Standardization of user interfaces , the rational submission to predefined
functionalities and the conformity of use , has driven even large scale computer
manufacturers out of business. 1am suggesting that a discipline , a theory or a discourse
whose normative implications are contradicted by so many contemporary experiences
becomes non-viable in the long run
Its Inherent Dualism. The Cartesion dualism is fundamental to all kinds of
。 bjectivisms

and naturally at home in mainstream semiotics. This is evident in the

foundational distinction between the world of signs , symb미 s and linguistic expressions
and the world of unlabeled objects and observer-independently existing physical events
The former possess the ability to mean , refer to , substitute for , represent or describe the
latter , but not the other way around. The two worlds are construed as being governed
by different laws , the semiotic rules or codes , and the natural (protoypically physical but
also including biological , psychological and some would even add sociological) laws.
The semiotic dualism replicates the stereotypical distinction between culture and nature
。r

between mind and matter and is sometimes rationalized in philosophical realism.
This dualism is not a mere philosophical issue. In the design of industrial

products , for example , it assigns product meanings and product functionalities or
materialities to distinct phenomenal domains an thereby promotes a partic 미 arly suspect
design practice. It makes semiotic practitioners , like Friedlander , to talk about the
meaning of a door handle as if the door handle were an object that could exist without
meaning (for anyone) and to which some meaning could mysteriously be attached (by
its designer). Accordingly , it becomes natural for semioticians to look for that additional
feature in the inessential aspects of form , the image of a lion ’ s head , for example ,
implying that without some such feature the door handle would have to be without
meaning or meaningless and moreover , that the perceiving and being able to handle
what the word "door handle" designates has noting to do with its meaning
Helen Karmasins 7 , representing a marketing view of product semantics , is guided
by the very same dualist conceptions , conceiving meaning as a value adding feature of
consumer products. 1am far from denying what 1see as her main point , that designers ’
awareness of semantics can i

9
su디략따피ng

cheaper materials while maintainina traditionallv valued aooearance~ ， Iike

pressing Navaho jewelery out of plastic , or (4) ß응을Q흐iating them with R.얻학넘띠니흐
indivi뎌니als ， designers , prominent figures that the users are made to believe they could
emulate.
Instead of seeking to understand how something comes to be meaningful in
users' minds and to enable this process through informed product design , the dualism
implied in the semiotic vocabulary , conveniently embraced by the rhetoric of advertising ,
creates a make belief world of deceptive symbolisms behind which lack of
understanding , alienation and frustration necessarily lingers.
Its Absurdities and Contradictions. For one example , the dualism just
assessed for its practical implications also leads to strange contradictions. If one insists
on distinguishing between a realm in which naturallaws govern physical events
independent of human observation and a realm consisting of semiotic phenomena ,
signs , symb이 s and linguistic expressions which seemingly are the products of human
consciousness , how can mainstream semioticians justify studying their empirical domain
from the very same removed and outsider ’ s perspective that physicists employ to inquire
into theirs? How can one simultaneously claim semiosis to be a phenomenon of human
consciousness and yet describe it as if humans either did not exist , have nothing to

d。

with it or variously use what is considered same for everyone? Doesn ’ t this kind of
semiotics conceptually undermine its own premise.
Consider another example. Ulric Neisser (1976) , after conducting numerous
experiments , concluded that we do not see things but meanings. James Gibson (1979 ,
1982) , before him said much the same by suggesting that we do not perceive 。이 ects
but affordances. Gestalt psychologists build their approach on the experimentally
verifiable experiences that we cannot identify absolute sounds but contrasts between
them , melodies for example , that we recognize figures only against a ground , in other
words , that an observer-independent physics of sensory impressions has little to say
about what and how we see. Imanuel Kant , long ago , concluded: things as such are
constitutionally inaccessible to us. Obviously , one cannot simultaneously claim that we
。 nly

see meanings and that an object (which we would have to be able to distinguish

and identify as such without its meaning) has (or conveys) me
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Unicorns exemplify another class of semiotic oddities. Unicorns , we know , do not
exist. When we see one we therefore must deny its status both as real and as a pictorial
representation of something rea l. This lack of reference leads us to describe unicorns
with a syntacticallanguage that cannot but bring to bear on its description the kind of
experiences we have with the animals unicorns remind as of, thus reintroducing the
representational attributes just denied. A film shot in the stage set of a totally imaginary
town is equally paradoxica l. The camera shoots something that is at once real and
imaginary , an original fake. Computer generated images that represent nothing outside
that computer ’s own mode of operation pose similar problems to semiotics and artifacts
。r

objects of design can be seen in the same semiotically paradoxical state. Saying that

something , a unicorn , Gotham City , a spoon or a stone , for that matter , refers to itself is
just an effort to save a misguiding objectivism by attributing actor status to 。이 ects.
Things , like unicorns , are what they mean to us in our experience neither because a
theory tells us which experiences are legitimate (even so semiotics may just try to do this
in its own domain) nor because the things have the intention to represent themselves in
ways they do.
Its Inability 01 Self-reflexion. Let me conclude my criticism by pointing to what

might underlie all four of the difficulties mentioned: Mainstream semioticians see the
object of semiotic analysis , the world of semiosis , as existing independent and outside of
their describing it. This sharp distinction between the semiosis as observed by a
detached semiotician and what semioticians do in their own work prevents semioticians
from entering their own empirical domain and makes their own theories and empirical
accounts of semiotic phenαnena immune to semiotic considerations. It also enables
them to deny responsibility for the very semiosis their semiotic accounts may set in
motion in those addressed , in the phenomena being described , including in their own
cognition. In short , mainstream semiotics is non-reflexive if not authoritarian in
consequence (in the sense of both being unquestionably above and not caring for the
cognition of those affected by it). In stating this so bluntly , 1 do not imply unethical
intentions or devious conduct , but , as 1 suggested earlier , that it is the semiotic
conceptualizations
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whereas men see in their home a place to withdraw after work , view television and relax ,
a place to play with kids and be with friends and a place to keep one ’ s material
possessions. It also concluded that most home layouts were created by male architects
and afforded men ’s home uses more so than women ’ s. Notwithstanding that the very
act of asking these questions may have made interviewees aware of the phenomenon
being addressed , notwithstanding also the preference of scientific "findings" t。
emphasize large frequencies (majorities) , commonalties and averages at the expense of
exceptions or deviations from main findings , when such scientific reports become
instructions to architects to develop layouts appropriate to women ’s "needs ," then past
sexual stereotypes are being reinforced , establish themselves as norms and become
built into the solid layouts of a home whose "forcing functions" might make it less and
less possible for women to escape.
Obviously , even innocent descriptions never are entirely neutra l. The semiosis
that Flade ’ s insightful "report" encourages has the potential of unintentionally reinforcing
the appalling sexual stereotypes whose observation motivated the study. A lesson of
this example could be to report not the facts as "found" but what this study could give
rise to when embodied in the practice of living in architectural spaces. It serves here as
an adequate demonstration that semioticians , through their inquiries into the meanings
of others , are themselves involved in a semiosis that constructs and hence changes the
very reality they seek to describe so innocently. Objectivists are committed to render
nothing other than accurate descriptions and are thereby prevented from understanding
the self-reference of their own practice.
Without claiming to know the right way , I am afraid , the objectivist road might lead
to a "semiotized world"

f비 I

of problems and contradictions that may leave little space for

alternatives and to feel at home. Let me therefore retract from the road commonly
travelled to where a smaller path branched of and continue in a radically different
direction.
The Trail Worth Blazing: Towards a Constructivist Semantics
I have to be brief now. let me therefore demand , foremost of myself and with
implicit justification taken from the preceding , that
(i)

Semantics , as a theoretical discourse on meaning , be embedded in human
understanding as a recursive cognitive process. Humans should be recognized
as constitutive participants in the worlds any semantic theory may construct.

(ii)

My understanding and , hence , also the semantics I am
concerned with here , must embrace (Ieave space for and take account of) others ’
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understanding of the social practices through which we might be concerned with
each other. Semantics arises out of social practices , informs them in return and
therefore must be valid for observers and for observed others alike.
(iii)

On the premise that understanding always is someone ’s self-reflective
achievement and never finished as such , semantics should be creative and
constructive of further understanding and enable the construction 01 coherent
worlds , the design of meaningful artifacts and discourse presumed
understandable by others included.

It would follow that such a semantics must spell out the cognitive operations of
understanding it is intrinsically concerned with. It should not designate a class of 0비 ects
。f

interest , for example signs , but the cognitive processes that brings them into being

Let me mention a few processes a constructivist semantics should embrace
Understanding. To me , understanding is a recursive process of constructing
(deconstructing , reconstructing and inventing) (reality) constructions whose cognitive
unfolding (into various practices , interventions and actions) preserves the very process
of construction within the experiences of its embodimen l. Let me elaborate on some of
its properties.
Understanding is a cognitively autonomous process. It arises within individual
cognition. It is personal and private. It can be neither transmitted to someone else nor
imposed from the outside. (Any "influence" is a matter of one ’ s own causal
constructions on how different experiences are connected , how one chooses to explain
them). Understanding is not 마 something outside , understanding is , onq미맥， a
process. The eigen value of understanding (where the process converges to with time)
may be the feeling that one ’ s reality constructions are coherent , sufficiently complete
and viable in practice.
Understanding is a recursive process. As such it builds on its own products , piles
explanations on top of explanations , continuously decomposes , reconstructs , elaborates
and transforms the constructions already there , weaving concurrent experience into
them. "Original" or "raw" experiences , which are hardly accessible as such , recede with
time in their importance for directing the process.
Understanding is a creative and constructive undertaking. Reality constructions
therefore happen by invention , not by necessity. This is far from saying that
understanding is arbitrary. Understanding directs its own history and is constrained by
experiences arising from its unfolding constructions into (social) practices and by
contingencies (perturbations) from its embodimen t. It is within these constraints that its
artifacts may arise spontaneously. If understanding were structure-determined and

’
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individuals would therefore have no choice in how they construct their realities , a sense
of self could not arise and nobody could be held responsible lor their actions. If
understanding were totally arbitrary , without a viability check , individuals would have to
be solipsists and as such unable to respect , live and communicate with others like them.
Thus , the notion 01 understanding here proposed may be nothing more than a creative
perpetuation 01 socially viable constructions.
Understanding delines its own horizon. What is within seems coherent and
meaninglul , what is beyond escapes comprehension (or may not be seen at all). The
horizon may expand , 01 course , with experiences and in time , but only Irom within. For
example , as it directs its own history , understanding also provides the passing contexts
(01 reality constructions) for perturbations to enter. However, the causes of these
experiences cannot be known outside of understanding or constructing them--which
would keep them inside that horizon. For any one individual , there can therelore be no
reality , no (social) practice independent of his or her understanding
Understanding dedicates all 01 its processes , all 01 its resulting reality
constructions (including the construction 01 an observing self, others , a physical world
and its horizon) to the preservation of understanding (coincidentally including its
embodiment , for example , in the medium 01 a biological system which may remain
unknown as such). One could also say , the purpose 01 understanding is to sustaining
itself in the lace 01 perturbations arising lrom its embodimen t. 9 Alternatively , it could be
said that cognitive systems are constituted or constitute themselves to sustain their
recursive understanding including themselves. Or , as Spencer-Brown concluded , "we
cannot escape the fact that the world we know is constructed in order (and thus in such
a way as to be able) to see itsell" (1972:105).
Understanding and (social) practice belong to different phenomenal domains , to
different realities. Anyone ’ s (participation in social) practice is inseparably lused and
hence indistinguishable from his or her own sell-understanding. Observing and seeking
to understand the practices in which others participate involves seeking to understand
the understanding by others. One's own understanding and someone else ’s
understanding have different embodiments and therelore belong to dif
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understanding.
With this understanding of understanding in mind , let me develop a few concepts
for a constructivist semantics.
Position. The distinction between my understanding and my effort to understand
a social practice in terms of someone else ’s understanding gives rise to different
positions one may take within one ’ s own reality constructions. For example , in
communication research , one may want to distinguish between the position of the author
and the positions of different kinds of readers vis-a-vis that of the communication
researcher who links both through a text. The text may be something entirely different
for each. To capture this difference (without privileging one ’s own reading as right and
everyone else ’ s as wrong or biased in degrees) requires the ability to take different
positions. Taking different positions from which to construct and see something that
may appear to us to be the same for everybody enables choices among alternative
constructions of reality and accordingly requires taking responsibilities for constructing
them.
Objectivist knowledge is positionless. Indeed , the belief in the existence of a
single reality outside its observer , a uni-verse , which is the same for everyone , renders
alternative positions meaningless. What is seen then is projected onto this outside reality
for which no one can be held responsible except for having to accurately describe it. In
this belief , alternative forms of understanding become human failures or distortions of
reality
Minimally , positions are evident in our describing what we see (the people in our
lives or the artifacts we handle) relative to our body. Someone is a father , an employee
or an

id미

to me or to someone else but not necessarily to both. "Hard" and "soft" are

defined relative to our experiences of touch. Whether we talk about people or
computers , either has a front , facing us , and a back , facing away from us. And when we
describe the functionality of artifacts we refer to what 쁘l2. are able or unable to do with
them , whether they help or hinder 브흐 Thus , our self is intricately involved in how we see
even the most elementary things. Helga and Hans-Juergen Lannoch (1989) used this
natural self-reference in ordinary language descriptions of form to argue for a nongeometric notion of space that includes the position of the observer.
The situation is more complicated when we have reasons to believe that what we
are seeing from our position has positions of its own and different from us , when we do
not merely observe but observe the observing by others. This is the key

t。

understanding human communication. In human communication , the cognitive
autonomy of others , including their ability to choose positions of their own must be
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mutually respected else interaction ceases to be social and reduces to manipulating
。thers

as tools.
However , 1 do not want to get into issues of communication here. Instead , 1 want

to elaborate on the earlier question of what it takes to understand someone else ’s
meaning (of something) , which is the prototypical question semantic analyses should
answer. If we say we see only meanings , as Neisser suggests , or affordances , as
Gibson ciaims , or the experiential consequences of the embodiments of our own reality
constructions , then such positionless statements as "the Ii on is a symbol of protection ,"
"red means danger" or "the airodynamic shape of a car indicates its speed" would not
make sense without knowing who is talking. (For this reason , 1 argued that Friedlander ’s
promulgations are Friedlander ’s account of Friedlanders perceptions , unjustifiably
projected onto everybody else). As soon as we speak about others with cognitive
capabilities similar to our own then we can no longer insist that Q핀뭉댁 respond to how
쁘흐

see things. We have to respect their own understanding. Thus , asserting what

something means for others constitutes a relationship between constructions on
different logicallevels: our understanding and our construction of someone else ’ S
understanding. It entails that we acknowledge our own position from which we see (or
understand) and to construct from this very position the positions of others from which
we have reasons to suspect they see (or understand) differently. In a constructivist
semantics taking positions and appreciating (by construction) the positions others take
is critica l.

1 might add here in passing a distinction , proposed elsewhere (Krippendorff,
1990b) among three kinds of positions , that of a becomer, of an observer and of a
subject. In the area of semantics , becomers realize their own semiosis and are involved
in a continuous process of self-realization. Becomers are aware of making themselves
at home in their own understanding. Observers are aware of their ability to construct
and reconstruct signs , symbols and artifacts outside themselves but not that this could
apply to their own position and to themselves. Designers are prone to taking this
position. Subjects see themselves as having to adapt and therefore willingly subject
themselves to realities constructed as residing outside their participation and control , for
example , to fixed meanings , unquestionable

1
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created in taking different positions and in this difference might lie the fundamental
notion of a sign
Metaphor. Objectivists have little analytical use for metaphors , variously
describing them syntactically as literary figures of speech , semantically as making vague
。r

allusory references and pragmatically as forms of poetic embellishment and all along

blaming them for inconclusive thinking. To me , metaphors , while manifest in certain
linguistic figures or visual forms , reflect a very precious cognitive operation. Metaphors
seem vague and uncertain only when one is destined to look for referents outside
cognition.
Roughly , "metaphors make us see one thing in terms of another" (Lakoff and
Johnson , 1980; Lakoff, 1987). They become manifest in changing our perceptions.
More specifically , there always are (1.) two distinct domains of experiences , (2.) a
structure , pattern or principle of construction is transferred or carried from one (and
usually well understood) domain into another (and usually inadequately understood)
domain which it thereby (3.) organizes in ways not experienced or seen without this
import. The latter involves fitting existing parts from the target domain into new wholes.
Once the imported structure makes sense (4.) metaphors serve as a bridge for bringing
a variety of additional entailments to the target domain. Two examples will suffice
People use all kinds of nonprescription drugs for all kinds of reasons. In the U.S. ,
the complex web of motivations for drug production , dissemination and use is
increasingly understood through war metaphors. Although there are other ways of
understanding drug use , for example , as a disease (medical metaphor) , as a community
。r

educational issue (social metaphor) or as criminal behavior (l egal metaphor) ,

accounts of "the war on drugs" by politicians , the media and ordinary folks make it into a
battleground. Whereas a medical metaphor entails treatment and care for the diseased ,
the war metaphor entails a distinction between friends and foes , brings forth and
mobilizes resources to fight the enemy , justifies even the invasion of another country ,
Panama as it were , calls for personal sacrifices , winning or losing being the only
outcomes. Metaphors are not true or false. They organize perceptions and actions
through their terms.
Another example is the shape of personal computers. There is no natural form.
The boxes of a mainframe computer are as good as the human figure of a fictional robot
Since the working of a computer is underst
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domains. However , they also drove their evolution. The first PC ’ s had line screens. The
user saw his or her outputs not much different from how it came out of a typewriter , line
by line and moving up the screen. But TV also shows colors which were added t。
computers as a matter of course. TV also has moving images and sound which are now
being realized in various hyper-card applications. 80 , the entailments of the TV
metaphor drives computer development within the horizon of understandability.
From the point of view of a constructivist semantics , metaphors are far from
representations that are plagued by referential ambiguity and falsehood. Underlying
their linguistic expression are rather definite cognitive operations that create new
perceptions and organize actions , render meaningful what heretofore was
incomprehensible and constitute new realities we thereafter observe with surprising
certainty. Metaphors reflect a cognitive process that creates new meanings.
Metonymy: Sense and Function. Metonymy reflects the cognitive operation of
pa야s

relating

to wholes. It explains or overcomes the difference created by drawing a

distinction between something and wherein it resides , what it is a part of, the
background against which it comes to the fore , for examples , between inside and
。 utside ，

between text and context, between an organism and its environment and

between the observer and the observed. Clearly , neither wholes nor parts (which are
wh이 es

in their own right) can

e씨앉

without the two cognitive operations of drawing part-

whole distinctions and making sense of what keeps the thus created parts together.
Elsewhere (Krippendorff, 1988, 1990a) , 1 suggested a distinction between
meaning and sense , describing them as the result of two different operations on
experiences. We say that âomethina makes sense when we understand the role it plavs
in a particular contex1, when we have a metonymic understanding of what we see it
does. It makes sense that the movement of a pen over paper leaves a mark. It makes
sense that a bolt holds two pieces of hardware together. In contrast , the meaning of
something is the sum total of all the contexts for which we are able to imagine a sense
for it. My pen does not just write , it can serve me in numerous capacities for eexample ,
to operate my computer wristwatch. In short , âomethina means (or enables someone

t。

anticipate and see) its possible contexts of us~. Thus , by analogy , sense is to meaning
as actuality is to potentiality , as performance is to competence (Chomsky) or as speech
is to language (8aussure). We acquire sense by perception and action. We acquire
meaning by grouping the many senses we could make (of something) in different
settings into a recognizable class. 1 have frequently argued that Qesian is makina sense
띠다미며원

(Krippendorff , 1989 , 1990a). It calls for designing meaningful things , artifacts

whose workings are understandable in particular contexts and by prospective users.
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Metonymy probably reflects the cognitive prerequisite of objectivist notions of
sign. For example , for a cause to become an index of its consequence (or for a
consequence to indicate its cause) presupposes (1) drawing a distinction in time and in
kind between two events and (2) explaining the difference thus created in causal terms
Onlya야er

these cognitive operations were performed on the initially undifferentiated and

whole experience , can one event serve as an index of the absent other. Classical
examples of metonymies are taking a crown as a sign for a monarchy , using (the image
。f)

a table setting as the sign for a restaurant , making a logo designate a corporation

(e.g. by imprinting it on every communication , building or product).
Helene Karmasin 10, in her plenary presentation , gave several good examples of
efforts to change the definition of products by presenting them in new contexts for TV
viewers to make sense of, for example , deodorants in the context of romantic success or
expensive cat food in the context of treating someone spe미 al ， the cat , for giving
invaluable companionship. The aim of this form of advertising is to create metonymies
that encourage viewers to make sense that can be generalized to a belief in buying , not
a mere chemical that removes odors , but a means to interpersonal success or not mere
food to feed a cat but a way of cultivating cor끼 panionship.
Metonymy also underlies functional analyses , ranging from the social sciences to
engineering. Sociology , for example , defines the function of an individual act by how it
contributes to the well-being (essential prerequisites) of a society. In social psychology ,
social roles are described by the function a person performs by virtue
。ffice ，

마

holding an

position or title within a social organization. In systems theory , the function of a

subsystem is what it does relative to all other parts of the larger system , mathematically
expressed by an equation relating inputs to outputs.
Being serious about the possibility of taking different positions within one ’sown
reality constructions , 1 am suggesting that a fun다ion is nothing other than the
disembodied sense somethina makes in a professionallv privileaed context
"Disembodied" because it surrenders one ’ s own position to a virtual community or group
defined by the presumption of sharing a discourse , seeing alike or making the same
sense of things. "Privileged" because the context i
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semioticians. AJI speech communities tend to privilege their own functional discourses.
For example , an AI engineer may consider the functional architecture of a computer as
the only reality that counts and user conceptions as secondary , subjective and unreal ,
whereas a user may see that computer primarily as a device for acquiring a competitive
advantage over others , rendering the senses made by others less importan t. Similarly ,
when designers get excited about an unusual artilact , their professional discourse
prevents them from analyzing their emotions and instead places such an artifact in the
context of socia Jl y established aesthetic theories which just때 arguing in terms of
proportions , symmetries , repetitions , etc. , not realizing that this way 01 seeing is rather
specialized to their profession.
Sense and functions arise out of the same metonymic processes but differ in the
responsibilities taken or refused for what is seen
Polysemy: Meanings and Affordances. By accounting lor meanings , for
example , in terms of contents 01 containers as in
correspondences as in

"x has the meaning 01 Y" or in terms of

"x substitutes lor Y ," objectivist semiotics favors one-to-one

relationships. Dictionaries , catalogues 01 symb이 s and codes describing such
relationships are witness to these preferences and when such one-to-one descriptions
cannot be achieved , contexts are sought out as disambiguating agents. This is merely
an effort to rule out

p이ysemy.

Consider a few examples 01 uses 01 the word "play:"

to
to
to
to
to
a
child's

p1ay tennis
play down an ìssue
play something in someone else's hands
play around with someone of the opposite sex
play a game of chess
play by Shakespeare
play
playboy magazine
a playboy
"play" plays different roles in different contexts
"play" plays different roles in different contexts.

In these examples , there seem to be few if any commonalties among the senses in which
"play" decisively participates. It would therefore be difficult to claim the word to have a
core meaning that different contexts merely modify (see synecdoche below). "Play"
simply is polysemous which is to say that it can assume a range of roles in different
situations. The only constancy in these examples is the word "play."
In view of the chamelion-like senses something can make in different contexts , the
semiotic ideal of finding simple correspondences between sign-vehicles and what they
refer to or mean , also expressed in the apparent need lor disambiguation , may be a
hopeless il not oppressive undertaking , save lor the most restricted semantic domains ,
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for examples , traffic signs , legal terms , technical vocabulary , military ranks and
dictionaries used in teaching. In fact , in all of the latter examples there are institutional
reasons for forcing unambiguous use. What is needed here is some kind of field theory
of meaning.
In the preceding , 1defined sense as an
actuallv doingln

apa며C비 ar

ex이 anation

of what something is seen as

context of experiences , the role it plays for someone , and

meanings as the roles something 으민』디 play or what it could be made to 뎌Q in a range of
imaginable contexts. 80 , a pen is not just an instrument for writing. It can also be a
pointer , a stylus , a projectile , a book mark , a reason for holes in one ’s pocket , a
fingernail cleaner , a gift , a status symbol , a sales item , an expense , something to hold a
women ’ s hair in a knot , etc. , etc. Although some uses of a pen , may be more typical
than others , the word "play" does not seem to have a single most outstanding sense.
When Neisser suggests we see rneanings , not stimuli or things , this would entail that we
see in a chair the possibility of our sitting on it , moving it , stapling it , etc. , or that we see
in a Porsche the possibility of driving fast , impressing someone else , etc. This is not t。
suggest that we always have in mind all the

cμIturally

conceivable contexts of use for

what meets our senses , but that the meanina of somethina eauals our oresent
anticioation of what we could do with it. in which contexts it would make sense to us
Meanings always are relative to someone ’ s circumstances of understanding.
A concept closely related to this notion of meaning is affordance. Gibson (1979 ,

1982) originally coined the term to account for his observation that pilots , seeking to land
their aircraft , look for and see in the surfaces they are exposed to not what it is but
whether an aircraft is

"landß.미51."

He extended this idea to perception in general ,

suggesting that something becomes a chair because it is perceived as affording sitting ,
that something becomes a cup because it is seen as affording the containment of fluids ,
etc. Gibson certainly was an objectivist or realist as he described himself who believed
that it is the nature of the perceived

。이 ect

that provides information and does the

affording. This led him to disembodied accounts analogue to that of functions as
discussed above but , unlike the objectivism of his period , his affordances clearly are
anticipatory and describe abilities or potentialities. Gibson ’ sa
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in the cycle 01 production and consumption) 01 artilacts become assailable and
questions about what a depersonalized object (as seen by designers) may mean
partic비 ar

t。

users can be answered. One could say , designers , like good communicators ,

engage in discursive practices through the articulation 01 artilacts whose meanings lor
particular users must also be afforded by them else a user will approach his or her
environment with expectations that are bound to lail (Krippendorff , 1989). However , t。
state such a relationship between affordances and meanings , as in the previous
sentence , requires a relativistic understanding 01 different individuals’ understanding ,
including one ’s own. This relativity withdraws the objectivity lrom Gibsons claims and
makes the very difference between affordances and meanings 01 prime interest to a
semantics for designers. It also shifts the aim 01 design lrom creating aesthetic lorms 01
products to providing those affordances that enable ordinary users to understand their
artilacts in their own way and to engage with them in socially desirable practices
(ultimately with the designers as well).
Thus , a constructivist semantics must recognize

p미 ysemy

as a normal case , not

as the undesirable exception. It should look lor meanings in the multitude 01 contexts
someone is capable 01 constructing lor something to make sense. It has to relativise
such meanings by taking into account different positions , particularly comparing one ’s
。wn

understanding with understanding 01 someone else ’s understanding 01 what either

may understand quite differently. To reduce object-meaning relationships to one-to-one
correspondences or codes , like purporting the lion to be a symb이 01 protection ,
suppresses the very scope 01 understanding a constructivist semantics seeks t。
provide.
Synedoche: Types and Tokens. Often conlused with metonymy , synecdoche
rellects the cognitive operation 01 relating (not parts to wholes but) species to genera ,
tokens to types , objects to categories , etc. It is the process by which we identify what
something is , to which category it belongs which underlies the linguistic notion 01
connotation. It enables the naming 01 something not previously experienced by relating
it to a lamiliar type
Objectivists deline categories in terms 01 what all the instances 01 a category or
the elements 01 a set have in common. 11 This most naturally leads to logical
taxonomies 01 downwardly increasing commonalities. The elaborate classilication
systems 01 signs in semiotics provide ample examples 01 the consequence 01 such a
delinition
Constructivist semantics relies instead on the cognitive operations that invoke
identifying and categorizing experiences. It delines categories not by boundaries but by
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their center , often called prototype , ideal type or type for shor t. The evidence in favor of
the latter is strong and has a considerable history. There is Wittgenstein ’ s (1958)
concept of family resemblance according to which a category of things need not be
represented by what they all have in common but by the connectivity among its
members. There is Chomsky’ s argument that we cannot learn a language by being
exposed to all sentences of that language for we construct new ones all the time and
understand even ungrammatical sentences with ease. There is Rosh ’ s (1978) work on
prototypes suggesting that we can far easier express how close something is to what is
most typical of a category , its prototype , than to draw a boundary around all members.
Athavankar (1989 , 1990) explored categorization and

protαype

theory for design

in which the identification of something is an important issue when marketing an entirely
new product or redesigning a familiar artifact. The boundaries between a cup , a mug
and a bowl may be fuzzy but the ideal- (or proto-) type is clear for any one user. Jochen
Gros once described the type of a category of artifacts as its "Wesen 12"
'",, or essence
Recently Johnson (1987) suggested that meaning forms a category as well ,
connecting a multitude of contexts that may have nothing in common other than that the
same thing links the different senses it participates in into a single category , the category
。f

the artifact. One could argue that anything seen always already is an artifact of

cognition by virtue of meaningful prototypes available for it
Cognitive Models: Schemas and Scripts. When we approach a new
experience , we always bring to it a repertoire of patterns for understanding , structures
that have guide the coordination of perception and action in the past , maps we have
available to walk in similar terrain , scripts we are accustomed to follow , often without
much thinking. These phenomena may be captured here by a single concep t. To me , ß
c。 anitive

model is a recurrent pattern that recursivelv connects experiences and maps

then into understandina so that we mav reason with them. Let me elaborate.
Basic schemas , like cause and effect , map and territory , sign and referent , text
and context , actor-action-targets and the semiotic triangle already are cognitive models ,
albeit simple and general ones. These organize many experiences semioticians have as
evident in semiotic discourses. What is importan
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__ environmen t. Within what such an environment affords , cognitive models entail their
。wn

limitations. They work or remain viable as long as their unfolding into social

practices does not create difficulties for themselves or end up in a breakdown or trap.
However , having said that understanding , our cognitive models included , has

n。

knowable outside referent , we nevertheless can study the cognitive models held by
。thers

in our own understanding and compare them with our own constructions of the

practice they inform. This seems possible because our ability to reason with them and to
express them in verbal discourse. For example , Kempton (1987) carefully analyzed the
verbal accounts given by different users of thermostatic home heat control devices and
could construct from them what seemed to be the guiding conceptions of the practices
he could observe. Kempton found that individuals approached thermostats either with
the cognitive model of a valve or with the cognitive model of a feedback loop. Those
guided by the valve model caused more extreme temperature differences , had to reset
the thermostat more frequently and experienced more frustrations than those guided by
the feedback mode l. The material system afforded both cognitive models , of course , but
brought forth rather different experiences for their beholders. The fact that there are
engineers who know the system they constructed does not enter the experiences of
either kind of users who saw no reason to change their conceptions.
The for practical purposes absence of correspondence criteria for evaluating
cognitive models is most striking in the design of user interfaces for computers. The
interior of a computer is virtually incomprehensible to most competent users. Within the
extremely wide confines afforded by a computer , users have the freedom to develop
their own and often rather weird conceptions of how the computer does what is
experienced and in turn use those conceptîons that worked to generate experîences that
would follow from them. These conceptîons often come from entirely different domains
of experiences (see metaphors) and computer înterface designers may take advantage
of cognitive models in use to design operations that afford them. For example , by
affording opening and storing files , discarding documents in a waste basket which have
little to do with what the computer does but much with schemas of human
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understanding of the cognitive models in use and discourse probably is the best window
into their cognitive constructions. Cognitive models cannot be shoved aside as "mere"
conceptua l. They are demonstrably real
Interactivity: Semiosis and Involvement. As a final point , 1am suggesting that
a constructivist semantics would have to embrace change as a constitutive principle of
understanding. Mainstream semiotics ’ self-imposed aim to describe the world in terms
of binary relationships as enshrined in the semiotic triangle not only limits the complexity
of the phenomena it is led to tackle but also betrays what probably motivated its
。 riginators ，

Charles S. Peirce for example , to initiate the project , and this is semiosis , the

process by which signs come to be , semiogenesis if you wish. Inquiries int。
relationships presupposes they exist as such and looking for codes makes one find
them in the stabilities of a world that resists variation. In this kind of semiotics , semiosis
reduces to learning established signs , adapting to existing conventions and institutions
and supporting the status quo. A theme that ran through much of this paper is that
cognition is inherently restless. People ’ s understanding not merely adapts but creates
social practices. There are many realities , not one , and these are constantly taken apart
and constructed anew when we cognitively or discursively attend to them. Asserting
something , like producing an artifact , always changes the world we live in , albeit by small
measures.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the already mentioned world of modern
personal computers. Computers are general purpose machines to start out with on
which hardware designers impose a simple architecture that users cannot change
Beyond this , there is a whole industry that competitively provides software for making
computers more understandable to users. Software links the computer designers'
understanding of how a system works to users' understanding of the same. It is by
traditional definitions a mechanism of communication between the two , but of a
qualitative new kind. The critical feature of such a mechanisms is not to influence , t。
control or to enforce a particular behavior , but 따흐디빡르 users , senders or receivers , t。
do something with and in terms of their very own understanding.
By comparison , traditional machines essentially are trivial in structure , embodying
particular input-output relations. 13 They are conceived as tools whose specialized use
has to be learned and perfected. They force users to adapt to them. The motivation for
lheir employment largely derives from achieving certain goals outside of th
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understanding. This makes them more adapting to users' cognition than the other way
around. The motivation for their use comes less from extrinsic achievement but from
intrinsic involvement in the process of unfolding ones cognition in interactive practices.
The more natural it feels , the more self-directed one can move and the more open

t。

meaningful alternatives a computer is , the more fun it is to interact if not play with it. The
evolution from word processors to Macintosh windows to hyper-media applications and
to virtual realities is semiosis at its best.
Science always had an affinity to technology , sometimes using it as a testbed for
its theories and sometimes taking from it models and metaphors for constructing its
theories. It seems that we have to move away from the objectivist vocabulary of icons ,
codes , causal chains and binary relations , away from reprensentational and instrumental
conceptions of language and away from the search for accurate descriptions ,
predictions and control , all of which are so clearly tied to trivial machine conceptions.
The artifactual world we now experience has grown far beyond our traditional horizon of
understanding. We have to catch up to lead its ongoing semiosis
Modern computers do not provide the only metaphors for what a constructivist
semantics should be concerned with. Interactive practices of deconstruction ,
reconstruction and designing social realities in which participants understanding thrives
in cooperation with each other , creating institutional processes in which new realities are
envisioned and put into

pr없 s

and the very effort of constructing a constructivist

semantics for the design of meaningful artifacts among others , product semantics for
short , a semantics that brings forth the phenomena it claims to be about , these provide
ample examples of semiotic practices that could provide their own metaphors of
understanding.
Let me conclude with the quote from a magician of our trade who , through his
。wn

"Iooking glass ," may have anticipated much of what 1was proposing here by having

his characters engaged in this dialogue:
"When 1use a word ," Humpty Dumpty said , in rather a scornful tone "it means just
what 1choose it to mean--neither more nor less."
"The question is ," said Alice , "whether you

εan

make words mean so many

different things."
"The question is ," said Humpty Dumpty , "which is to be master that ’ s al l." (Lewis
Carroll , 1982:184)
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My answer would have to be found not in the authority of a semiotician but in the
constructions we must create by ourselves to live in.
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Footnotes

1 See a special issue of the Industrial Designer~ ~ociety_ of America ’ s magazine ,
띠nov학띠n흐효， 21984; a special double issue 이 Desian Issues Q, 2 , 1989; the
Proceedings from the eroduct Semantics ’8~ Conference , Seppo Vakeva (Ed.).
Helsinki: Ll niversity of Industrial Aπs ， 1990.

2 For example Ernst von Glasersfeld ’ s (1984) radical constructivism , Kenneth
(1985~ ，soci~12o~~tr~9~~~!s~， Peter , Be~g~~ ~"n~'l!~ol1l~~. Lu.c~~ann’s
Socíal Construction of RealitY. (1967) , George Lackoff (1987) and Mark Johnson ’s
(1987) cognitivism and varion~ s~ades_0 naive constructivisms ranging from
George Kelly (1955) to Jesse Delia (1977).
(,l er 9 E!f"!’ s

3 Congress participants may recognize here a certain parallelismin Humberto
Maturana’ s tWo kinds of explanations offered by observers. Speaking on the
biological foundations of signs , Maturanais correct by saying that in the history of
ev이 ution nothing happens by necessity , that we have no choice bιJt to live with
\iVhat did h~pp~ned and ~~at eX'plan~~i<?n~ a~.~ in my ~ord~ o~tional ph，eno~ena.
However , I am interested here in a slightly different domain where explanations
and social practices inform each other. In the domain of design , we occasionally
do make choices or at least experience the making of ch미 ces ， not just among
explanations but also in setting "the switches" for further explanations , hence the
importance , of the two paths here.
4 The difficulty of applying correspondence truth criteria also came to light in
Thomas Sebeok ’ s paper to this congress on "viπual reality ," a computergenerated interactive world providing virtually real experiences to users. He
grotjr뼈d the unce때inty 엄garding what 엄 ality is in conclusions 때ionally
erived at by certain philosophers but then proceeded to distinguish between
virtual realities , simulations and other forms of representation as if an unqualified
reality would knowably exist outside of us , as if the uncertainty as to how reality is
constituted could be ignored in its representations
5 In a recent article , Helga Lannoch and Hans-Juergen Lannoch (1989)
recognize t,hat ~he orthogonaU~ of ge~f!1etr!c space ct? nception~ can ,: ot
accommodate human perception and developinstead a semantic notion of space
whose attributes are relative to the position 0 • the observer within this space.
6 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , 1690
7 Helene Karmasin , "Mehrweπ durch Zeichenwahl , Semiotik in der Analyse von
Marketing und Werbung ," P
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understand the (social) practices of 마면댄 in terms of their understanding , since
understanding cannot exist outside of its embodyment (in a circular network of
perception an-d_ acti~n c ,? nstitution.ally. inv()lving the b~ologX of~hat other) , the
maintenance of a biological organization through self-production , which
autopoiesis seeks to explain , is a prerequisite for understanding to take place. In
the long run , understanding cannot contradict the autopoiesis of its embodyment.
10lbid.
11 See George Lackoff (1987) for a good discussion of this difference.
12 Jochen Gros , Form , sometimes before 1984.
13 For an elaboration of the trivial machine notion see H. von Foerster (1984)

